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Abstract 
 
The paper studies the determinants of the optimum prices of computer programs 
and their upgrades. It is based on the notion that because of the human capital 
invested in the use of a computer program by its user, this product has high 
switching costs, and on the finding that pirates are responsible for generating 
over 80 per cent of new software sales. A model to maximize the present value of 
the program to the program house is constructed to determine the optimal prices 
of initial programs and for those upgrading their programs. It is shown that an 
upward shift of the demand function of upgrades leads to an increase in the 
optimum price of upgrades and to a decline in that of initial copies. However, and 
upward shift of the demand function of initial copies increases their optimal price 
without affecting that of upgrades. The price of upgrades is higher, the smaller 
(greater) the absolute value of the derivative of the initial copy demand with 
respect to the upgrade price (its own price), the smaller the number of pirates 
purchasing their initial legitimate copies and, normally, the later they do it. The 
prices of these goods often move in opposite directions despite the fact that the 
goods can best be characterized as complements. Copy-protection is generally 
not optimal with standard programs having competing unprotected products, and 
it is normally optimal to use a drug-pusher's strategy in pricing and in other 
respects: get the user hooked and cash in on the upgrades. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A computer program is a non-perishable non-rival good, which requires a 
considerable human capital investment from its user – so considerable that many 
regard it as greater than the cost of the program. Therefore there has to be a 
special reason for the user to switch to another program and sink the human 
capital investment cost involved with the new program. As a non-rival good, a 
program can be copied, depending on the degree of copy-protection. Indeed, six 
out of every seven software users in the U.K. have been found to use pirated 
copies, but pirates were responsible for generating more than 80 per cent of new 
software buyers (see Givon et al. (1995); see also Goldman (1992)). At least 
currently, considerable technical progress is characteristic of the evolution of 
programs over time. This has led program houses to introduce upgrades at 
frequent intervals, and the programs are purchased not only by new users but 
also by users of old versions upgrading their programs, and by former pirates. 
When a user switches to an upgrade, he typically either turns in the old copy or 
discards it: there is no second-hand market for old programs separate from their 
platforms, apparently because of obsolescence. 
 
One would expect these special characteristics to have an important effect on the 
optimal pricing of software. Yet one sees a variety of pricing policies in the 
marketplace even with standard programs like word processors and 
spreadsheets, with the price for initial copies typically much higher than for 
upgrades. Some producers use elaborate copy-protection schemes, while others 
use none. A common preoccupation of all producers is piracy and the revenues 
lost as a result. 
 
The general approach to goods with switching costs was pioneered by Klemperer 
(for a survey, see (1995)). Of earlier writings on computer programs, Conner and 
Rumelt (1991) analyze the optimal pricing and protection strategies of a single 
program. An individual buys the program if its value, net of the human capital 
investment required to use it, exceeds its price. He copies it if the value exceeds 
the cost of copying, and goes without if it does neither. The value of the program 
increases, and the cost of copying decreases with the user base. They show that 
in the presence of this network externality, profits and the optimum price may 
increase or decrease with copy protection by turning some pirates into buyers, 
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and making others go without. If protection fails to increase legitimate demand, it 
is not optimal to use it (see also Katz and Shapiro (1986)). 
 
Nascimiento and Vanhonacker (1988) determine the optimum strategic pricing of 
a single program over time. Purchasers and copiers have a given reservation 
price, and each of them purchases or copies only one program or none, 
depending on the reservation price and the cost of the program or a copy. Due to 
the complicated structure of the model, the authors simulate four different 
scenarios rather than try to find analytical solutions, and conclude that when the 
product is not copy-protected, skimming pricing strategies tend to be optimal, and 
prices will eventually come down to compete against copying. Cumulative profits 
– while a function of the diffusion rates of copying and buying -- are generally 
highest when the product is fully protected. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of the characteristics 
described above on the optimal pricing of software from the point of view of the 
program house, given the information that can reasonably be expected to be 
available to the house at the time of the decision. We argue that the market for 
standard programs like word processors and spreadsheets is characterized by 
four distinct features, which we will incorporate in the model and which constitute 
its new features. They are also the respects in which this paper extends the work 
of Conner and Rumelt (1991), Nascimiento and Vanhonacker (1988) and Givon 
et al. (1995). The house not only offers a product, but also periodically introduces 
an upgrade with superior characteristics. The product is sold on two markets, one 
for initial purchasers and another for users of earlier versions upgrading their 
programs, and the house can discriminate between them due to registration 
programs or trading in. Secondly, the services of the program are highly 
“addictive” due to the differences in the user interfaces and other characteristics 
of the different programs so that users need a very strong reason to switch to 
another program and sink the human capital investment cost all over again. 
Third, pirates constitute a substantial part of program users, which the house 
does not observe, but pirates are responsible for generating over 80 per cent of 
new software buyers, as in Givon et al. (1995). They thus constitute the house’s 
quantitatively most important group of potential customers. However, a clear 
majority of pirates do not even intend to pay for their programs, and therefore it is 
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inappropriate to model their behavior as that of lifetime utility maximizers facing 
the prices of the initial copy and upgrades. 
  
Finally, the market for computer programs is characterized by rapid technological 
progress, with new superior products and processes entering at frequent 
intervals. Uncertainty concerning the characteristics and prices of future 
programs and hardware is so great that modelling the house and its clients as if 
they knew the future characteristics and prices a large number of years into the 
future is of doubtful value. We can therefore model the house’s pricing decision 
as present-value maximization, given the information available to the house at 
the time of decision, including static demand functions for the initial program and 
the upgrades, while allowing for growth. The house makes a new decision when 
the situation changes.  
 
We will determine the producer's present-value-maximizing prices for the 
program as well as its upgrades in a model where the public purchases a 
quantity of initial copies that depends on the initial copy price and the upgrade 
prices, and subsequently upgrades a price-dependent fraction of the stock of its 
programs each period. In addition, there is copying depending on the extent of 
copy protection, which the house does not observe, and, in accordance with 
Givon et al., after a certain period copiers start purchasing price-dependent 
quantities of legitimate copies, subsequently upgrading them in the same way as 
other purchasers.  
 
It will be shown that it is often optimal to use a drug-pusher's strategy in pricing 
as well as in other respects: the key is to get the user hooked in order to cash in 
on the upgrades. An upward shift of the demand function of upgrades leads to an 
increase in the optimum price of upgrades and to a decline in the optimum price 
of initial copies. However, an upward shift of the demand function of initial copies 
leads to an increase in their optimal price without affecting the price of upgrades. 
The optimal price of the upgrade is greater, the smaller (greater) the absolute 
value of the derivative of initial copy demand with respect to the upgrade price 
(its own price), the smaller the number of pirates purchasing their initial legitimate 
copies and, normally, the later they do it. Both prices are higher, the greater the 
marginal cost of the initial copy and its upgrades. Thus the prices move in 
opposite directions in many cases despite the fact that the goods are best 
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characterized a complements. Furthermore, its is generally not optimal to copy-
protect standard programs with unprotected substitutes such as word processors 
and spreadsheets, in partial agreement with Conner and Rumelt and contrary to 
Nascimiento et al..1 
 
It has been suggested to us that a highly competitive market and high switching 
costs are an unlikely combination. However, we submit that the market for the 
initial copy is highly competitive, whereas that of upgrades is a near-monopoly. 
The reason for the latter is high sunk costs due to the investment in program-
specific human capital in terms of having the routines, possibilities, compatibility 
with the buyer’s other programs, hardware, and network that switching to another 
program would make necessary. 
 
The program house has a vested interest in keeping up the switching costs in 
order to maintain its monopoly, and it can do it at a low cost: The buyer is unlikely 
to pay a premium for low switching costs, because in purchasing a program, he 
plans to use it or its upgrades for an extended period of time because of the sunk 
program-specific cost of the human capital investment. 
 
This approach applies to a large number of durable and even non-durable goods. 
E.g. car manufacturers compete on new car markets and cash in on parts. To do 
so they have derived various schemes to “enhance customer loyalty”. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is constructed in Section 2 and solved 
for the optimal prices in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We will analyze the optimal pricing decision of the program house for a standard 
program with unprotected substitutes. We will determine the prices of the 
program for initial buyers and for those upgrading their programs, given the 
information the house can be expected to have in the decision-making situation 
in this market characterized by considerable technological change: when the 
situation changes, the house performs another optimization. The house takes the 
public's behavior function as given. There are also illegitimate copy users, who 
do not even intend to buy a legitimate program and whose number is a function 
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of the user base. The house observes only the aggregate purchases of initial 
programs and upgrades. While it knows the result of Givon et al., it does not 
know which initial purchases are by pirates switching to legitimate copies. The 
pirates who purchase a legitimate copy do so because of factors like the peace 
of mind, including fear of viruses, manuals, and technical support. 
 
Specifically, the program house offers its initial program to the public at price P . 
The basic quantity sold each period ( )Q  is a function of the price of the original 
program and its upgrade . Each subsequent period the house introduces an 
upgrade with superior characteristics, exogenous to the model, of which the 
customers learn on its release. The upgrade sells at price 
( )N
P  to initial buyers and 
at price  to those upgrading their programs. The number of upgrades 
purchased each period is 
N
α  times the user base, with α  a function of , and 
upgraders discard or trade in their old programs.2 Beginning period , a 
number of illegitimate copy users, which is 
N
( )a
λ  times the legitimate user base, 
purchase their initial legitimate copies. Having become legitimate users, they 
subsequently upgrade their programs at the same rate as other users. The 
parameter λ  incorporates the possibility that the pirates’ price derivative of 
demand is different from that of other users, but the ratio of the derivatives with 
respect to P  and  is the same as that of other users.3 Givon N et al., found that 
the number of pirates turning into legitimate users is ( )SQ +4  for standard 
programs, where  is the purchases by upgraders. Since most users of pirate 
copies do not initially intend to pay the market price in the presence of 
unprotected substitutes, copy protection has an insignificant effect on  so that 
we can ignore this effect. This need not be the case for expensive specialized 
professional programs with a small potential user base, as suggested by Conner 
and Rumelt (1991). 
S
Q
 
The cost function of the programs is linear with a positive intercept, and the cost 
of each upgrade is 1<γ  times the cost of the original program. The decision 
variables for the program house are P  and . N
  
We have: 
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Eq. (1) is the expression for the present value of the program house's profit ( )π . 
The first summation is the present value of the sales revenue from the initial 
purchases of the programs at the rate of ( )Q  per period, or ( )QP , where rR +≡ 1 , 
with r  the discount rate used by the house. The house has an infinite planning 
horizon for simplicity and without loss of generality. The summation is followed by 
the purchases of upgrades costing  at the rate of N α  of the user base, the stock 
growing by Q  each period: a given version of a program qualifies for upgrading 
only once, and the programs replaced by the upgrades are discarded, as is 
usually the case. The third summation is the sales revenue from the initial 
purchases by users of illegitimate copies, starting in period ( )a  at the rate of λ  
times the legitimate user base. These purchasers upgrade their programs at the 
same rate as other program holders, as indicated in the next summation. 
 
The expressions for the costs of the programs are arranged to correspond to the 
four kinds of purchases. The first summation is the cost of the initial programs 
purchased. In the expression, the cost of the first version of the program is , 
and that of subsequent versions 
C
Cγ . The cost of the upgraded programs sold is 
the marginal cost  of that upgrade, given that the fixed cost has already been vC
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sunk. The same applies to the cost of the initial purchases by users of illegitimate 
copies (third summation) and their upgrades (fourth summation). 
 
It is worth noting that this formulation nests the case where  grows at rate . 
The growth rate can be incorporated into the discount factor, which would then 
be . 
Q g
grR −+= 1
 
Equation (2) is the cost function of the programs, stating that . cCv =
 
The basic demand for the initial copy is a declining function of its own price and 
of the price of the upgrade (Eq. (3)). Thus in choosing a program, the buyer takes 
into account not only the initial copy price but also the prices of the upgrades. 
The demand for the upgrade, as a share of the user base α  is a function of the 
upgrade price in Eq. (4): 
 
 
               (3)  
 hNk −=α   ,               (4) 
nNfPdQ −−=  
 
where , , , , and  are positive parameters. Of course, these functions 
are reduced forms of the consumers’ optimization problem, nesting such 
behavior as in Conner and Rumelt (1991) and Nascimiento and Vanhonacker 
(1988).  
d f k h n
 
Substituting Eq. (2) into Eq. (1) yields, after some manipulation:4 
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3. The Optimal Prices 
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Substituting Eqs. (3) and (4) into Eq. (5) and maximizing the resulting expression 
with respect to the decision variables P  and  yields: N
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where  ,βρ +≡ R  and  γκ hck +≡ . 
 
The effects of the different variables and parameters on the optimal prices are 
displayed in Table 1. The top two rows display the effects in the general model, 
and the bottom two rows the respective limiting values of the effects as  
approaches zero. In interpreting the expressions, we assume throughout that at 
least some initial programs and upgrades are sold, which requires that the 
marginal cost of the upgrade is smaller than the price at which no upgrades are 
sold, or 
n
hkc /<γ . 
 
    [Table 1 about here] 
 
It is more intuitive to start with the limiting case of , i.e. the demand for 
initial copies is not a function of the price of the upgrade. We then have: 
0→n
( 2//* )γchkN += : The optimal price of the upgrade is the mean of the price at 
which no upgrades are sold, and the marginal cost of the upgrade. It is an 
increasing function of this cost γc , and , or the intercept of the demand function 
of upgrades. It is a decreasing function of , or the absolute value of the price 
derivative of this demand function. 
k
h
 
The  is an increasing function of *P ,,,,, λγ andchd  and a decreasing function 
of . Thus an upward shift in the demand function of upgrades (  leads 
to an increase in their optimal price and to a decline in that of initial copies. 
fk and )k
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However, an upward shift in the demand function of initial copies  leads to an 
increase in their optimal price without affecting that of upgrades. The 
( )d
*P  is also 
greater, the greater the absolute value of the price derivative of the demand for 
upgrades , the greater the marginal cost of the programs  and their 
upgrades 
( )h ( )c
( )γ , and the greater the number of pirates purchasing their initial 
legitimate copies ( )λ . Moreover, it is greater, the smaller the absolute value of 
the price derivative of the demand for initial copies ( )f . It is an increasing 
(decreasing) function of (  if )a ( )( ) ( )111 <>−− Ra . Normally the latter condition 
holds, as (  is a few percentage points, and )1−R ( )a−1  is a negative number. 
Then if pirates purchase their initial legitimate copies later, *P  declines in the 
same way as when  declines. d
 
While the effects of , , , d f c γ , and λ  are intuitive, those of  and call for an 
explanation, since they affect  and 
k h
*N *P  in opposite directions, although the 
initial copy and the upgrade can best be described as complements. The 
explanation is based on this very fact: Upgrades can be sold only if initial copies 
have been sold first. Take . An upward shift in the demand curve of 
upgrades makes it optimal to increase their price, which increases profits and 
lowers 
dkdP /*
dPd /π  below zero ( )( 0// )<dkdPdd π . The house restores dPd /π  to 
zero by lowering the price of the initial copy. The resulting increase in sales 
increases the user base, which makes it possible to further increase future profits 
from upgrades (as  as a condition for maximum). An analogous 
explanation applies to the effects of 
0/ 22 <dPd π
( )h . 
 
The sign of  is ambiguous. While a decline in RP ∂∂ /* R  increases the present 
value of profits, the price at which dPd /π  is zero may be greater or smaller than 
the initial price, depending on parameter values. The discount rate does not 
affect . The effects of the expected growth rate of sales on the optimal prices 
are the negatives of those of 
*N
R , since 0/ <∂∂ gR . Thus  is unaffected by . *N g
 
When  rises from zero,  declines, because it now has a depressing effect 
on initial copy sales. The effect on 
n *N
*P  depends on parameter values, as a 
decline in P  increases sales but increases (decreases) the revenues on initial 
copies if their demand elasticity is greater (smaller) than unity. The user base, 
however, increases, increasing profits from upgrades later. This relationship is 
responsible for the fact that some of the effects become ambiguous in the 
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general case. It is unnecessary to further comment on the effects of most 
parameters, those of  and , conditionally, c  and ,, kd γ  remaining qualitatively 
the same. It is of interest that λ  now has a negative, and ( )a  a conditionally 
positive, effect on . If pirates come to the market in larger numbers or earlier, 
 declines. This is associated with the fact that these changes cause a 
conditional increase in 
*N
*N
*P . This increases the user base and thereby the 
demand for upgrades later, causing a marginal adjustment in  analogous to 
the response of 
*N
*P  in response to a change in  above. k
 
The result on the effects of λ  has an implication for copy protection. The partial 
effect of λ  on π  ( )λπ ∂∂ /  is positive. The λ  is a declining function of copy 
protection for standard programs with unprotected substitutes: for a new user 
without program-specific human capital, the closest substitute for a pirate copy is 
a pirate copy of another program, all else equal. So copy protection has an 
insignificant effect on the copies sold initially ( )Q . However, a copier lost to 
competition becomes “addicted” to its product’s services and becomes its 
potential customer. It follows that protecting these programs is generally not 
optimal. On the contrary, it is optimal to try to attract users to the house’s 
programs one way or another: 5  
 
However, protection can be optimal with specialized programs with a small user 
base and without unprotected substitutes, where it may have a significant effect 
on . Then the present value of profits due to users buying, rather than copying, 
their first program can be greater than that of pirates switching to legitimate 
programs later. These results are in agreement with Katz and Shapiro (1986) and 
Conner and Rumelt (1991), and at variance with Nascimiento 
Q
et al., who find the 
opposite about cumulative profits. One reason for the latter discrepancy is that 
the appropriate maximand is not cumulative profits but the present value of 
profits (which the authors duly maximize in their simulations). Moreover, the 
major source of sales (and profits) in our model - four times standard sales 
according to Givon et al. - comes from copiers switching to legitimate copies, 
which was discovered only in 1995, and from upgrades, whereas their individuals 
acquire only one program, and the producer has to compete against copiers, 
which generally lowers their optimal price later on. 
 
4. Concluding Comments 
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We have determined the optimal pricing of computer software and other products 
with high switching costs in a model where the public purchases initial copies of 
the program and subsequently upgrades them, also taking into account the 
purchases by users of pirate copies. 
 
It was shown that an upward shift of the demand function of upgrades leads to an 
increase in the optimum price of upgrades and to a decline in that of initial 
copies. However, an upward shift of the demand function of initial copies leads to 
an increase in their price without affecting that of upgrades. The price of 
upgrades is greater, the smaller (greater) the absolute value of the derivative of 
the initial copy demand with respect to the upgrade price (its own price), the 
smaller the number of pirates purchasing their initial legitimate copies and, 
normally, the later they do it. Both prices are higher, the greater the marginal cost 
of the initial copy and its upgrades. The prices move in opposite directions in 
many cases despite the fact that the goods can best be characterized as 
complements. 
 
Experiments with plausible numerical parameter values suggest that it is often 
optimal to use a drug pusher's strategy in pricing standard programs with 
unprotected substitutes, and pay the victim to take the first shot to get him 
hooked, and cash in on the upgrades. In these cases, it is not optimal to copy-
protect standard programs, since protection would only lead potential customers 
to competing products. 6 
 
The above policy is different from what one sees in the marketplace: Upgrading 
typically costs a fraction of the price of the initial copy. In terms of this model, that 
can be rationalized by the fact that in an upgrade, the user purchases only the 
marginal product of the new version over the old one. The user already having a 
close substitute, his  is lower and his  higher. However, the same is also 
broadly true of the house’s most important customer (according to Givon 
k h
et al.), 
the user of pirate copies buying his initial legitimate copy, which lowers  and 
increases . 
d
f
 
However, other components of the drug pusher's strategy are widely used, 
making it possible for the house to collect both on the initial copy and on the 
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upgrades. Many houses fail to copy-protect their products, introducing upgrades 
frequently, apparently counting on the λ  factor of the individual illegitimate user. 
Some houses use product differentiation. They offer inexpensive and often 
unprotected student versions with limited capabilities in addition to the standard 
version. This policy can also be expected to make the ( )a  of the full version 
smaller, thereby further increasing both the present value of the program to the 
house and often also its *P  and . However, if the standard version is copy-
protected without substantial academic discounts, it turns away faculty users, 
and with them also their students: The diffusion process never gets started. You 
have to get the teacher hooked to hook his disciples. 
*N
 
These results lead us to conclude that while it is optimal for software houses as 
an industry to intimidate and scare users of pirate copies, as individual competing 
businesses they would do well to court them, concentrating on the sales to be 
gained rather than on those lost: In pricing, they would do well to give less 
emphasis to the rational user maximizing lifetime utility, given the expected 
present value of the program's marginal product over its cost over his lifetime, --
which no one could possibly know -- and more emphasis to the initial user of 
possibly illegitimate or subsidized programs who does not even intend to pay the 
full fare, to get him hooked. Thereafter they should make the transition to legal 
copies as easy and as attractive as possible. Thus site licenses and generous 
offers to colleges and schools can often be in the long term interest of the house. 
Houses could also further exploit the “addictive” property of programs by using 
the same user interfaces in different programs. This would enchance the 
strategic significance of getting the user hooked on the house's first program -- 
points that appear to be well understood by Microsoft and the Department of 
Justice.7 
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Notes 
 
* I wish to thank an anonymous referee for useful comments. 
 
 
1. However, protection can be optimal with specialized programs with a  small 
user base and without close unprotected substitutes, when leakage to substitutes 
is not a serious danger. Then protection can affect not only addicted copiers’ 
purchases of legal copies later, but also current sales due to buyer substitution 
between legal and pirate copies of the same program. See page 10 below. 
 
2. The α  function is a reduced form of the user’s optimization, given his 
expectations, where the user weighs the perceived marginal product of the new 
version over the user’s version against the price of, and learning cost associated 
with, the new version. 
 
 
3. We think this formulation of copy protection is reasonably close to the 
observed behavior of individual users, since there are always unprotected 
substitutes available for standard programs. To be considered, the protected 
program has to dominate the unprotected competitor by wide enough a margin, 
to compensate for the fact that it cannot be tried out on the user’s own computer 
as easily as the unprotected substitute. Adjusted for this, the amoral buyer then 
weighs both programs’ marginal utilities against their marginal costs in the 
conventional way. 
 
Extending the model to include copy protection as a decision variable is 
straightforward, but it is beyond the scope of this paper, which studies standard 
programs. It would also complicate the expressions significantly, since  and Q λ  
are both functions of protection. 
 
4. Substituting Eq. (2) into Eq. (1) yields Eq. (5) as follows. The series 
 is the sum of the series  and the 
series . While the value of the former series is 
straightforward, the latter series equals 
( ) ( ) ⋅⋅⋅+++++ 2/2/1 RaRaa ⋅⋅⋅+++ 2// RaRaa
⋅⋅⋅+++ 32 /3/2/1 RRR
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( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]1/1// 321 −−=⋅⋅⋅−−−− −−− RdRdRRRRdRdR , which in turn equals 
. ( )21/ −RR
 
5. Outside this model, in increasing the total user base (including pirates) they 
also increase the program’s value to others via network externality effects, as 
shown by Conner and Rumelt, and make them potential customers.  
 
6. These results differ e.g. from Klemperer (1995), because our program house 
can discriminate between new purchasers and repeat purchasers. Furthermore, 
the pirates’ behavior prior to considering a legitimate copy is not affected by the 
prices P  and , given Q , since when they become users, they do not even 
intend to buy a legal copy of the program. 
N
 
If the initial copy price is much lower than that of upgrades, individual users 
would have an incentive to arbitrage between the two markets. They would 
upgrade their programs by purchasing the new versions as initial programs in the 
names of their family members, friends, or Mickey Mouse. This arbitrage 
possibility is easily incorporated in the model, but it complicates it unnecessarily. 
While the arbitrage possibility can be reduced by various means, it is likely to 
considerably limit the amount by which the price of the upgrade can exceed that 
of the initial copy. 
 
7. Providers on other markets have increased customer switching costs with 
discount coupons like frequent flier programs. Warranties are made conditional 
on having the product serviced and repaired at high-cost authorized dealers. Use 
of non-standard parts is another device, but it can backfire. Indeed, several 
manufacturers of producer durables have refocused their activities and now 
expect to generate most of their profits from the service and maintenance of their 
products. The sale of the product has then turned from an end into a means 
towards the service revenues. 
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 Table 1. The Effects of Different Parameters and Variables on  
                         the Optimal Prices 
 
dadddcdRdkdddhdndf ////////// λγ  
 
   /*dN    +          −         ?         0          +       (+)4)       +         +         −        (+)5) 
 
 
  /*dP    (-)7)     (±)2)    (±)6)     +           -          ?        (+)1)     (+)1)   (+)8)    (-)9) 
    
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
±+++−++−
+++−
→
)3)(?/*
00000/*
0
dP
dN
n  
 
 
 
 
 
7) if ( 1− )ρnR                       is dominated in the expression 
 
             2)   if  ± ( ) ρκρ fnR <
>−13
 
3)   iff ( )  ± ( ) 111 <
>−− Ra
 
4)  sufficient condition ( )( )[ ] 1111 >−−+ aRaρ  
 
5)  if  ( )( ) 111 <−− Ra
 
6)   iff  ± ( ) ( ) 01 <
>−−− ργκρ nRhcf
 
7) sufficient condition for ( -): ( ) ρκρ fnR >−13  
 
8) if ( )( )[ ]kRfc γγ −−− 211    is dominated in the expression 
 
9) if 5) and 8) hold. 
 
